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Abstract 
Recent research has linked facial expressions to mind perception. Specifically, Bowling and 
Banissy (2017) found that ambiguous doll-human morphs were judged as more likely to have 
a mind when smiling. Herein, we investigate three key potential boundary conditions of this 
“expression-to-mind” effect. First, we demonstrate that face inversion impairs the ability of 
happy expressions to signal mindful states in static faces; however, inversion does not disrupt 
this effect for dynamic displays of emotion. Finally, we demonstrate that not all emotions 
have equivalent effects. Whereas happy faces generate more mind ascription compared to 
neutral faces, we find that expressions of disgust actually generate less mind ascription than 
those of happiness. 
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When facial expressions do and do not signal minds: 
The role of face inversion, expression dynamism, and emotion type 
 
 Facial expressions of emotion can serve as “windows to the mind,” signaling others’ 
inner experiences, desires, and intents (Fridlund, 1994). Bowling and Banissy (2017) recently 
extended this work to demonstrate that emotional expressions can also signal whether targets 
have minds at all. Indeed, they demonstrated an “expression-to-mind link,” showing that 
smiling faces were more likely to be judged as having minds, relative to non-expressive 
(neutral) faces. Herein, we seek to replicate and extend Bowling and Banissy’s research by 
testing key boundary conditions that may influence how and when emotional expressions 
influence judgments of targets’ minds.  
First, past research has reliably demonstrated that configural face information 
influences both the identification of facial expressions (e.g., Bombari et al., 2013; Prkachin, 
2003) and mind perception (Deska, Almaraz, & Hugenberg, 2016; Hugenberg et al., 2016). 
Disrupting facial configurations by inverting faces both reduces emotion recognition abilities 
and leads to targets being rated as having less sophisticated minds. Given the joint role of 
face orientation in emotion perception and mind attribution, of primary interest was whether 
the previously established expression-to-mind link occurred even when faces were inverted, 
thereby hindering configural face processing. Thus, would emotional expressions have 
stronger effects on mind ascription when seen in upright versus inverted faces?  
 Second, dynamic (i.e., moving) facial expressions facilitate emotion recognition, in 
part because humans are sensitive to the direction in which expressions unfold (Krumhuber, 
Kappas, & Manstead, 2013). Similarly, moving faces may provide stronger cues to animacy 
than static faces. If inversion disrupts the expression-to-mind link for static faces, would this 
also occur for dynamic expressions? Given the richer expressive signal from dynamic faces, 
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we hypothesize that effects of inversion will be attenuated for dynamic displays of facial 
emotions. 
 Finally, whereas Bowling and Banissy (2017) showed that emotionally expressive 
targets are more likely to be ascribed sophisticated minds, this past work only tested happy 
versus neutral expressions. Of additional interest is whether other emotional expressions, and 
especially negative emotional expressions, signal that targets possess minds. Past research 
has linked mind perception to observers’ desire for social affiliation (Powers, Worsham, 
Freeman, Wheatley, & Heatherton, 2014). Thus, perhaps the expression-to-animacy link is 
clear when faces signal affiliation (i.e., happy expressions). But would similar effects occur 
for disgust expressions? Because disgust signals revulsion (Rozin, Haidt, & McCauley, 
2008), perhaps disgust expressions may be seen as less mentally sophisticated than neutrally-
expressive faces. 
Current Research 
 In the current research, we sought to replicate and extend Bowling and Banissy’s 
expression-to-mind link by testing 1) whether this link relies on configural processing, 2) 
whether dynamic signals of expressions override disruptions of configural processing, and 3) 
whether the expression-to-mind link occurs for both accepting expressions (happiness) and 
rejecting expressions (disgust). 
To investigate these questions, participants judged whether human/cartoon morphs 
had minds, and we manipulated a) the orientation of faces (upright vs. inverted), b) the type 
of display (static vs. dynamic), and c) the emotional expression (happy vs. neutral vs. 
disgusted).  We operationalized mind perception in two ways. Our primary measure was the 
ascription of agentic mind – whether targets can “think and plan” (Gray, Gray, & Wegner, 
2007). Given that agentic minds also qualify entities as moral agents (i.e., capable of doing 
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good and evil; Gray, Young, & Waytz, 2012) a secondary measure of moral agency assessed 
whether targets seem “capable of moral action.” 
Method 
Participants and Design. 283 students (215 women, Mage=22.2, SD=5.75) were 
recruited, ensuring 98% power to detect a 2 x 2 x 3 interaction effect (Cohen’s f = .10, α = .05 
two-tailed), assuming a 0.8 correlation between the measures. Because the target faces were 
White, only White/Caucasian participants were recruited to eliminate cross-race effects 
(Krumhuber, Swiderska, Tskankova, Kamble, & Kappas, 2015). The design included within-
subject manipulations of emotion (3: disgust, happiness, neutrality) and morph level (7), and 
between-subject manipulations of display (2: static, dynamic) and orientation (2: upright, 
inverted). Participants were randomly assigned to one of the four between-subjects 
conditions, resulting in ~70 participants per condition. Participants received either course 
credit or £2 for participation. The study received ethical approval from the Department of 
Experimental Psychology, University College London, United Kingdom. 
 Materials. Stimuli consisted of 3 White male face identities (front view), each 
expressing the three emotions: disgust, happiness, and neutral. All expressions were obtained 
from the Amsterdam Dynamic Facial Expression Set (ADFES; Van der Schalk, Hawk, 
Fischer, & Doosje, 2011; see also Krumhuber, Skora, Küster, & Fou, 2017). We employed 
both static and dynamic portrayals of each expression. Dynamic stimuli were comprised of 
short video-clips (6s) which showed the face changing from non-expressive to peak 
emotional display. Static stimuli consisted of a single frame of the peak expression. For 
neutral displays, no emotional expression was visible, although the videos showed minor 
naturalistic movements of targets’ head and eyes.  
To create the faces’ artificial analogues, modifications were applied to the facial 
texture in each image or video frame (25fps; see Rosin & Lai, 2015). This produced realistic 
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cartoons of the same identities. We next used the human and cartoon versions of each image 
to create human/cartoon morphs; human and cartoon facial stimuli were morphed 
parametrically in seven equidistant steps of 16.7% (see Figure 1), netting 63 static and 63 
dynamic stimuli (3 faces x 3 emotions x 7 morphs). We further manipulated face orientation 
(upright vs. inverted) for each display, resulting in 252 stimuli. All stimuli were displayed in 
color on white backgrounds. 
Procedure and Measures. After providing informed consent, participants were 
informed that they would see faces that varied in appearance from human to artificial. Their 
task was to rate the extent to which they believed each target “has a mind” and “can act 
morally.” Ratings of mind and moral agency were blocked; with order counterbalanced 
across participants.  
In each of the two blocks, participants were presented with the same set of 21 
randomly sequenced face stimuli at the center of the screen (6s per face). Face stimuli 
showed the three emotions (disgust, happy, neutral), each expressed by a different face 
identity, at seven morph levels (the same target only portrayed one emotion in a set). The face 
identity-emotion mapping was counterbalanced between-subjects. After viewing each 
stimulus, participants provided ratings for perceived mind and moral agency using a 7-point 
Likert scale (1=definitely does not have a mind/cannot act morally; 7=definitely has a 
mind/can act morally) before viewing and rating the next stimulus. 
Results  
Ratings for agentic mind and moral agency were linearly transformed from the 
original 7-point scale into scores ranging from 0 to 1 (with higher scores indicating greater 
levels of the dimension). They were then averaged across the three face identities and 
submitted to 3 (emotion: disgust, happiness, neutrality) x 7 (morph level) x 2 (display: static, 
dynamic) x 2 (orientation: upright, inverted) ANOVAs, with the latter two variables between-
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subjects. The ANOVAs yielded a three-way interaction between display, orientation, and 
emotion for both ratings of mind, F(2, 558) = 3.08, p = .048, ηp2 = .01, observed power = .59; 
and moral agency, F(2, 558) = 4.66, p = .011, ηp2 = .02, observed power = .76.1 To 
decompose the interactions, separate ANOVAs with emotion, morph level, and orientation 
were conducted for static and dynamic displays. For all analyses, a Greenhouse-Geisser 
adjustment to degrees of freedom was applied and Bonferroni correction was used for 
multiple comparisons (see Supplementary Materials for model fitting and PSE analyses). 
Static displays 
The analysis revealed main effects of morph level for ratings of mind, F(6, 846) = 
414.32, p < .001, ηp2 = .75, and moral agency, F(6, 846) = 311.64, p < .001, ηp2 = .69. Facial 
stimuli were ascribed higher levels of mind and moral agency the more human-like they 
looked. There were also main effects of emotion for mind perception, F(2, 282) = 5.14, p 
= .007, ηp2 = .03, and moral agency, F(2, 282) = 31.88, p < .001, ηp2 = .18. However, these 
were qualified by a significant interaction between emotion and orientation: mind, F(2, 282) 
= 5.02, p = .008, ηp2 = .03, observed power = .80; moral agency, F(2, 282) = 8.34, p < .001, 
ηp2 = .06, observed power = .95.  
Emotional expressions exerted a greater impact in the perception of upright than 
inverted faces, see Fig 2a. Upright faces received lower ratings of mind when expressing 
disgust relative to either neutrality, t(72) = -3.22, p = .006, 95% CI [-0.09, -0.01], d = -.29, or 
happiness, t(72) = -4.78, p < .001, 95% CI [-0.09, -0.03], d = -.36. No such difference 
between emotions was observed for inverted faces, ps > .99, ds < .01. 
The pattern of results was similar for ratings of moral agency. Disgust led in upright 
faces to lower ascriptions of moral ability than did neutrality, t(72) = -6.26, p < .001, 95% CI 
[-0.14, -0.06], d = -.59, or happiness, t(72) = -6.70, p < .001, 95% CI [-0.18, -0.09], d = -.79. 
Happy expressions also differed significantly from neutral expressions, t(72) = 2.45, p = .032, 
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95% CI [0.002, 0.08], d = .24. For inverted faces, a distinction was only made between 
disgust and neutral expressions, t(69) = -2.75, p = .029, 95% CI [-0.08, -0.003], d = -.25. All 
other comparisons were non-significant, ps > .09, ds < .02.2 
Dynamic displays 
The analyses revealed main effects of morph level for both ratings of mind, F(6, 828) 
= 282.28, p < .001, ηp2 = .67, and moral agency, F(6, 828) = 207.68, p < .001, ηp2 = .60, such 
that faces were ascribed greater mental and moral capacity with increasingly human-like 
appearance. In addition, there were main effects of emotion for mind perception, F(2, 276) = 
22.81, p < .001, ηp2 = .14, and moral agency, F(2, 276) = 47.14, p < .001, ηp2 = .25. As seen 
in Figure 2b, mind attributions were lower in response to neutral expressions relative to either 
disgust, t(139) = 3.01, p = .009, 95% CI [0.01, 0.06], d = .19, or happiness, t(139) = 6.54, p 
< .001, 95% CI [0.04, 0.10], d = .42. Also, happy expressions significantly differed from 
those of disgust, t(139) = -3.84, p = .001, 95% CI [-0.06, -0.01], d = -.23.  
For ratings of moral agency, disgust led to lower attributions compared to either 
neutrality, t(139) = -3.32, p = .004, 95% CI [-0.08, -0.01], d = -.31, or happiness, t(139) = -
8.88, p < .001, 95% CI [-0.17, -0.10], d = -.84. Happiness also received higher ratings than 
did neutrality, t(139) = 7.03, p < .001, 95% CI [0.06, 0.11], d = .55. 
The interaction between emotion and orientation was non-significant: mind, F(2, 276) 
= 0.64, p = .529, ηp2 = .005, observed power = .16; morality, F(2, 276) = 1.92, p = .152, ηp2 
= .014, observed power = .38. Thus, face orientation did not modulate the effects of emotion 
in dynamic faces. 
Discussion 
 Herein, we sought to replicate and extend the previously demonstrated expression-to-
mind link. We conceptually replicated Bowling and Banissy’s (2017) previous findings that, 
in most of our conditions, happy faces were seen as having more sophisticated minds than 
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neutrally-expressive faces. However, we also found that face inversion attenuated the effects 
of emotional expressions on mind perception in static faces. Consistent with previous 
evidence (e.g. Prkachin, 2003), configural face processing seems necessary for static displays 
of emotion to affect mind perception. Notably, however, dynamic faces showed different 
results.  Face inversion did not hinder the effects of expressions on mind perception. Thus, 
Bowling and Banissy’s original finding of happy faces appearing more mindful was equally 
strong for upright and inverted dynamic displays.  
 Second, the current data demonstrate that not all emotions equivalently signal mind.  
Whereas upright happy expressions were typically seen as having more agentic minds and 
greater moral agency, disgusted expressions tended to show the opposite pattern. Consistent 
with past research (e.g., Powers et al., 2014), perceivers are more likely to attribute minds to 
targets signaling social acceptance (smiling) than social rejection (disgust). Notably, this 
disgust-driven reduction of mind perception is observable for both measures of agentic 
minds. Further, an additional study (see Supplementary Materials) replicates the findings 
using both new measures and naturalistic expressions of emotions, further supporting these 
differential effects of expressions on mind attribution. Somewhat surprising was that dynamic 
neutral faces attracted lowest ratings of mind. This could be due to the perceived lack of 
behavioral intentions as evident in a moving, but non-expressive face. Hence, it is possible 
that valence may play a stronger role in judging whether a target is capable of moral agency 
(i.e., good vs. bad actions) compared to whether targets have minds (i.e., are mentally capable 
vs. incapable). Future research would benefit from investigating this in more detail. 
 Taken together, the present research conceptually replicates previous findings 
showing that happy faces trigger more mind ascription. Here, we also show that these effects 
are bounded by face orientation, expression dynamism, and emotion type. 
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Footnotes 
1 There were also significant main effects of morph level, Fmind(6, 1674) = 684.20, p 
< .001, ηp2 = .71, Fmorality(6, 1674) = 513.36, p < .001, ηp2 = .65; and emotion, Fmind(2, 558) = 
16.10, p < .001, ηp2 = .06, Fmorality(2, 558) = 75.24, p < .001, ηp2 = .21; morph level by display 
interactions, Fmind(6, 1674) = 3.26, p = .035, ηp2 = .01, Fmorality(6, 1674) = 5.12, p = .005, ηp2 
= .02; emotion by display interactions, Fmind(2, 558) = 12.36, p < .001, ηp2 = .04, Fmorality(2, 
558) = 6.51, p = .002, ηp2 = .02; emotion by morph level interactions, Fmind(12, 3348) = 1.90, 
p = .035, ηp2 = .01, Fmorality(12, 3348) = 2.21, p = .011, ηp2 = .01; and emotion by orientation 
interactions, Fmorality(2, 558) = 4.59, p = .012, ηp2 = .02. Because the main effects and lower-
order interactions were qualified by a significant three-way interaction between display, 
orientation, and emotion, we focused on the highest order interaction. 
2 For ratings of moral agency, there was also a significant interaction between 
emotion and morph level: F(12, 1692) = 2.72, p = .002, ηp2 = .02. For all seven morph levels, 
disgust expressions were ascribed less moral agency relative to happy (ps < .01) and neutral 
expressions (ps < .05). In addition, happiness led to higher ratings of moral agency compared 
to neutrality in morph 4 (p = .011). 
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Figure 1. Facial exemplars of three male targets ranging from artificial (left) to human-
realistic (right), showing disgust (top row), no emotion/neutral (middle row), and happiness 
(bottom row).  
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Figure 2. Ratings of mind and moral agency for disgust, neutral, and happy expressions as a 
function of (a) orientation and emotion in static displays, and (b) emotion in dynamic 
displays. Error bars represent SEM. 
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Supplementary Materials 
 
When facial expressions do and do not signal minds: 
The role of face inversion, expression dynamism, and emotion type 
 
by E. G. Krumhuber, Y. Lai., P. L. Rosin, & K. Hugenberg 
 
 
Model fitting 
Average ratings of mind and moral agency were obtained across the three facial 
exemplars for each point on the morph continuum (from 1- artificial to 7- human). The 
resulting mean values were then linearly transformed from the original 7-point Likert scale to 
scores between 0 and 1 (with higher scores indicating greater levels of perceived mind and 
moral agency). To obtain psychometric curves for each dependent measure, the standardized 
scores were fitted with a Gaussian distribution in GraphPad Prism 6 (GraphPad Software 
Inc., California, USA). This provided an overall fit index of participants’ judgment data to the 
mean estimated slope. As shown in Figures S1 and S2, a good fit was achieved for all models 
(r2s > .86) which allowed for the calculation of the Point of Subjective Equality (PSE). 
Outliers were identified on the individual PSE values for each participant falling beyond the 
M + 2.5 SD range and were treated as missing data in the PSE analyses. 
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Figure S1. Mean ratings of mind and moral agency for disgust, happy, and neutral 
expressions in static displays at each point along the morph continuum (1-7) including error 
bars (SEM) and the fitted curves per measure. r2 = model fit index. 
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Figure S2. Mean ratings of mind and moral agency for disgust, happy, and neutral 
expressions in dynamic displays at each point along the morph continuum (1-7) including 
error bars (SEM) and the fitted curves per measure. r2 = model fit index. 
 
Point of Subjective Equality (PSE) analyses 
PSE values were derived from the fitted curves in GraphPad Prism 6 where the face 
ratings correspond to the ordinate midpoint of a measure (0.5 at y-axis in Figures S1 and S2), 
thereby reflecting the point on the morph continuum where the face is judged 50% animate. 
ANOVAs with the within-subjects factor emotion (disgust, happy, neutrality) and the 
between-subjects factor orientation (upright, inverted) were performed on the PSE scores of 
mind and moral agency separately for static and dynamic displays.  
 
Static displays 
The analysis revealed a significant main effect of emotion for ratings of moral agency, 
F(2, 218) = 10.15, p < .001, ηp2 = .09, but not mind, F(2, 234) = 0.67, p = .502, ηp2 = .01. The 
emotion by orientation interaction was significant for both mind, F(2, 234) = 4.84, p = .011, 
ηp2 = .04, and moral agency, F(2, 218) = 4.78, p = .016, ηp2 = .04. As shown in Figure S3a, 
thresholds for attributing mind, t(66) = 1.98, p = .023, 95% CI [0.08, 1.40], d = .22, and 
moral agency, t(59) = 4.01, p < .001, 95% CI [1.04, 3.67], d = .72, were significantly higher 
for upright faces displaying disgust compared to happiness. That is, disgust faces needed to 
look more human-like in order for them to be seen as mindful and morally agentic than happy 
faces. Disgust expressions also led in upright faces to elevated thresholds in moral agency 
ascription compared to neutral expressions, t(58) = 3.51, p = .001, 95% CI [0.43, 2.25], d 
= .49, which in turn were judged at higher morph levels than happiness, t(61) = 1.81, p 
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= .019, 95% CI [-1.89, -0.13], d = .29. No such difference between emotions in mind and 
morality thresholds was observed for inverted faces, ps > .52, ds < .17. 
 
Dynamic displays 
The analysis revealed a significant main effect of emotion for ratings of mind, F(2, 
222) = 11.30, p < .001, ηp2 = .09, and moral agency, F(2, 208) = 10.30, p < .001, ηp2 = .09. As 
seen in Figure S3b, thresholds for attributing mind were higher in response to neutral 
expressions relative to either disgust, t(117) = -3.16, p = .021, 95% CI [-1.16, -0.07], d = -.26, 
or happiness, t(119) = -5.13, p < .001, 95% CI [-1.41, -0.46], d = -.44. Happiness led to the 
lowest thresholds in morality attributions compared to neutrality, t(110) = -3.42, p = .003, 
95% CI [-2.02, -0.33], d = -.35, and disgust, t(112) = 4.57, p < .001, 95% CI [0.70, 2.71], d 
= .58. The interaction between emotion and orientation was non-significant: mind, F(2, 222) 
= 0.05, p = .946, ηp2 = .00; morality, F(2, 208) = 0.94, p = .390, ηp2 = .01. Thus, face 
orientation did not modulate the effects of emotion on perception thresholds in dynamic 
faces. 
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Figure S3. Mean PSE values (shown as original morph numbers (1-7)) of mind and moral 
agency for disgust, neutral, and happy expressions as a function of (a) orientation and 
emotion in static displays, and (b) emotion in dynamic displays. Error bars represent SEM. 
 
Additional Replication of the Differential Effects of Expressions on Mind Ascription 
In order to replicate the effect of emotion on mind perception with more naturalistic 
stimuli and a new measure of mind ascription, 77 participants (36 women, Mage = 38.4 years, 
SD = 13.1) were recruited via Amazon’s Mechanical Turk. These participants saw a series of 
still images of naturalistic expressions, varying in emotion (disgusted, happy, neutral).  
Images were taken from the FGnet database (Wallhoff, 2004; for a review see Krumhuber et 
al., 2017) and presented in color (size: 640 x 480 pixels). Stimuli depicted three White male 
identities, each displaying a disgust, happy, or neutral expression under spontaneous emotion-
eliciting conditions. Participants saw only one exemplar per emotion, thereby 
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counterbalancing the face identity-emotion mapping between participants. For each stimulus, 
participants completed the 10-item Mind Attribution Scale (Kozak, Marsh, & Wegner, 2006, 
α = 0.92) which was presented on the same screen. Scale ratings for each target were 
averaged across expression type and subjected to a repeated-measures ANOVA. 
This ANOVA revealed a significant main effect of emotion on mind perception, F(2, 
152) = 3.26, p = .041, ηp2 = .04. Overall, disgust resulted in lower ascriptions of mind 
compared to happiness, t(76) = 2.61, p = .033, 95% CI [0.01, 0.44], d = .22. Although the 
difference between disgust vs. neutral and happy vs. neutral was not significant (ps > .23, ds 
< .19), a significant linear trend emerged for emotion, F(1, 76) = 6.81, p = .011, ηp2 = .08, 
suggesting that mind attributions increased with the positive valence of the expression 
(disgust < neutral < happiness). 
 
